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Abstract. In this paper, we present improved related-key attacks on
the original DESX, and DESX+, a variant of the DESX with its pre-
and post-whitening XOR operations replaced with addition modulo 264.
Compared to previous results, our attack on DESX has reduced text
complexity, while our best attack on DESX+ eliminates the memory
requirements at the same processing complexity.
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1 Introduction
Due to the DES’ small key length of 56 bits, variants of the DES under
multiple encryption have been considered, including double-DES under
one or two 56-bit key(s), and triple-DES under two or three 56-bit keys.
Another popular variant based on the DES is the DESX [15], where the
basic keylength of single DES is extended to 120 bits by wrapping this
DES with two outer pre- and post-whitening keys of 64 bits each. Also,
the endorsement of single DES had been officially withdrawn by NIST in
the summer of 2004 [19], due to its insecurity against exhaustive search.
Future use of single DES is recommended only as a component of the
triple-DES. This makes it more important to study the security of variants
of single DES which increase the key length to avoid this attack.
In this paper3, we present improved related-key attacks on DESX and
DESX+. This work extends the results in [20]. Note that such attacks
are applicable to any cryptosystem that uses pre/post-whitening with
additional keys, rather than just to DES-based schemes. Previous related-
key attacks on DESX and DESX+ have been reported in [14] and [20]
3 A summary of prelim results were presented in [22].
respectively. We remark here that our results on the DESX variants do
not invalidate the security proofs of [15, 16], but serve to illustrate the
limitations of their model. In particular, we argue that one should also
consider a more flexible model that incorporates related-key queries [2,
13, 14].
1.1 Our model
Related-key attacks [25, 2, 13, 14] are those where the cryptanalyst is able
to obtain the encryptions of plaintexts under both the unknown secret
key, K, as well as an unknown related key, K ′ whose relationship to K
is known, or can be chosen [25, 2, 13, 14]. Natural generalizations consider
several more related keys e.g. 22 [3], 28 [12] or up to 216 [13]. Most related-
key attacks use related keys with a chosen key difference. For instance,
the related-key attacks in [2] require two related keys such that some
round key bits match, the recent attack on full SHACAL-1 [4] requires 2
to 23 related keys satisfying specific relations on all key bits; the attacks
on full KASUMI [4] require 22 related keys that differ in only one bit
between each related key pair; and the recent [17] best known related-key
attacks on AES-192 and AES-256 require 26 related keys satisfying strict
relationships between them.
The first variant of our attack on DESX in Section 3 uses related keys
that differ by some known difference in the pre- or post-whitening key,
while the second requires related keys where the pre- or post-whitening
keys are negations of each other. While our basic attack on DESX+ in
Section 4.1 requires 26 related keys with specific chosen bit differences,
our more efficient attack in Section 4.2 requires just 2 related keys where
the pre- or post-whitening keys are complements of each other.
Some researchers consider related-key attacks as strictly theoretical
and which involves a strong and restricted attack model. However, as has
been demonstrated by several researchers such as [25, 13, 14, 10, 21, 23],
some of the current real-world cryptographic implementations may allow
for practical related-key attacks. Examples of such instances include key-
exchange protocols, hash functions and cryptoprocessors, details of which
we refer the reader to [25, 13, 14, 10, 21, 23]. In a different direction, the
security against related-key attacks has been considered in the theoretical
provable security setting [1, 18, 24] as well.
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1.2 Outline of the paper
We briefly recall previous attacks on DESX and DESX+ in Section 2. In
Sections 3 and 4, we present our improved related-key attacks on DESX
and DESX+ respectively. We also discuss in Section 5 how to apply our
analysis as part of a fault attack. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Previous Work
We review in this section all previously known attacks on DESX and
DESX+.
In the non-related key setting, Daemen [11] presented an attack on
DESX that requires 232 chosen plaintexts (CP s) and 288 single DES en-
cryptions, or 2 known plaintexts (KP s) and 2120 single DES encryptions;
Kilian and Rogaway [15, 16] gave an attack requiring m known plaintexts
and 2118−log2 m single DES encryptions, i.e. for m = 232, the number of
encryptions is approximately 2113; and Biryukov and Wagner [9] gave
an attack requiring 232.5 known plaintexts, 232.5 memory and 287.5 single
DES encryptions.
Kelsey et. al [14] presented a related-key attack on DESX that re-
quires 27 related-key known plaintexts (RK-KPs) and 256 single DES
encryptions.
Meanwhile, Phan [20] presented two related-key attacks on DESX+
requiring 2 related-key known plaintexts, 2120 single DES encryptions and
no memory, or similar texts, 256 single DES encryptions and 256 memory.
These are the only known attacks on DESX+.
Comparing these previous results, it appears that DESX is stronger
than DESX+. Our results in the next few sections will further strengthen
this fact.
3 Related-Key Attacks on DESX
In this section, we will present two variants of improved related-key at-
tacks on DESX. First, we define DESX encryption, denoted by:
C = Kb ⊕EK(P ⊕Ka), (1)
where EK(·) denotes DES encryption under keyK. Note that DESX is ba-
sically single DES encryption with pre- and post-whitening via exclusive-
OR (XOR).
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The intuition used in our attack is that if we obtain the encryptions




b = (Kb ±D) mod 2
n, to get
the ciphertexts C and C ′ respectively, then:
EK(P ⊕Ka)⊕Kb = X ⊕Kb = C (2)
EK(P ⊕Ka)⊕K
′




XORing both equations, we obtain:
C ⊕ C ′ = Kb ⊕K
′
b = Kb ⊕ (Kb ±D) mod 2
n. (4)
This is illustrated in Fig. 1, where
⊕
Ka
denotes XORing with Ka. Notice
that we started off with the same plaintext, P , and the similarity between
























Fig. 1. Related-key differential attack on DESX
Since the Left Hand Side (LHS) of equation (4) is known, and the
difference, D between the keys is also known, we can try all possible
values of Kb and verify if the RHS equals to the LHS. Each verification
requires 2 XOR operations and 1 modulo addition, which is negligible.
With the correct choice ofD, this reduces the keyspace ofKb considerably,
and so repeating the attack up to 3 times with different plaintexts, P s or
key difference, Ds will leave only two possible choices of Kb, one of which
is the correct key.
In total, we need 3 pairs of related-key known plaintexts (6 RK-KP s),
neglibile effort and memory. Once Kb is obtained, use it to peel off the
last key XOR, and simply do a meet-in-the-middle attack requiring 256
single DES encryptions and 264 memory. Alternatively, repeat the attack
in the reverse direction with related-key known ciphertexts to obtain Ka
with similar complexities. We are then left with the single DES encryption
which can be brute-forced with 256 single DES encryptions.
Alternatively, we let K ′b = −Kb mod 2
n. Then XORing equations (2)
and (3):
C ⊕ C ′ = Kb ⊕K
′
b = Kb ⊕ (−Kb) mod 2
n = Kb ⊕ (Kb + 1) mod 2
n. (5)
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Trying all possible keys Kb and checking for equality with the LHS allows
to reduce the keyspace after repeating a few times. With Kb recovered,
the attack is repeated in reverse to obtain Ka.
In summary, we can attack DESX with 6×2 ≈ 23.5 related-key known
plaintexts/ciphertexts (RK-KP s), and 256 single DES encryptions. The
amount of required texts is less than Kelsey et. al’s attack.
4 Related-Key Attacks on DESX+
We now discuss two related-key differential attacks on DESX+. First, we
define DESX+ as
C = Kb +EK(P +Ka). (6)
4.1 A Basic Attack
Let ∆Kb denote the difference betweeen Kb and K
′
b with respect to XOR,
X denote the intermediate state just before modulo addition with Kb or
K ′b, C[i] denote the ith bit (for i = {0, . . . , 63}), and bit i means the bit
that is set in the value 2i. Our related-key differential attack is as follows:
1. Choose ∆Kb = ǫ[i] which denotes a ‘1’ in bit i and 0 elsewhere.
2. Obtain the DESX+ encryption of P under both K = (Ka,K,Kb) and
K ′ = (Ka,K,K
′
b) = (Ka,K,Kb ⊕ △K), and denote them as C and C
′
respectively. Refer to Fig. 2.











+Ka - EK - +Kb -
X C
Fig. 2. Attack 1: Related-key differential attack on DESX+
Note that the only difference between Kb and K
′
b is in the ith bit.
C[i + 1] and C ′[i + 1] might be different due to a carry over from bit
i, caused by the addition of X[i] and Kb[i] (resp. K
′
b[i]), and a possible
carry over from bit i-1 (denoted as CY [i− 1]).
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Possible values of X[i], Kb[i] (resp. Kb[i]
′) and CY [i − 1] that cause
a carry over from bit i into C[i+1] (resp. C[i+1]′), are given in Table 1
(resp. Table 2).
Table 1. Values of X[i], Kb[i], and CY [i− 1] causing a carry from bit i
X[i] Kb[i] CY [i− 1] Carry into C[i + 1]? Value of C[i]
0 0 0 No 0
0 0 1 No 1
0 1 0 No 1
0 1 1 Yes 0
1 0 0 No 1
1 0 1 Yes 0
1 1 0 Yes 0
1 1 1 Yes 1
Table 2. Values of X[i], K′b[i], and CY [i− 1] causing a carry from bit i
X[i] K′b[i] CY [i− 1] Carry into C
′[i+ 1]? Value of C′[i]
0 1 0 No 1
0 1 1 Yes 0
0 0 0 No 0
0 0 1 No 1
1 1 0 Yes 0
1 1 1 Yes 1
1 0 0 No 1
1 0 1 Yes 0
From the above observations, we see that for the cases where C[i+1] =
C ′[i+ 1] (either with or without carries into both C[i+ 1] and C ′[i+ 1]),
then we have the following:
Kb[i] = C[i] (7)
and
K ′b[i] = C
′[i]. (8)
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Meanwhile, for the cases where C[i + 1] 6= C ′[i + 1] (one has a carry
into bit i +1 while the other does not), then we have the following:
Kb[i] = C[i] (9)
and
K ′b[i] = C
′[i] (10)
where C[i] denotes the complement operation. This gives us 1 bit of Kb
(as well as K ′b). We can repeat this for all bits, i (0 to 62) of Kb with
corresponding ∆Kb = e[i] (for i = 0 to 62). This leaves us to determine
the MSB of Kb via exhaustive search.
This requires 1 plaintext encrypted under K and also under 63 other
differentK ′s corresponding to∆Kb = e[i] (for i = 0 to 62). The processing
complexity involves the exhaustive search of the MSB which typically
takes up to 2 trial encryptions. Meanwhile, memory is negligible.
After obtaining Kb, repeat the attack (see Fig. 3) but in reverse direc-
tion to obtain Ka with similar complexities. In more detail, this involves
1 ciphertext decrypted under K and under 63 other different K ′ corre-
sponding to ∆Kb = e[i] (for i = 0 to 62).
We are then left with the single DES encryption which can be brute-
forced with 256 single DES encryptions, thus the overall attack complexity










+Ka ﬀ EK ﬀ +Kb ﬀ
X C
Fig. 3. Repeat the attack in reverse i.e. under decryption
Note that although this attack requires more texts than previous re-
sults [20], the gain is the reduction in the number of encryptions and the
fact that no memory is required.
4.2 A More Efficient Attack
There is a more efficient related-key attack on DESX+. Let’s start with
an intuition. Consider if we numerically add D to the final key, Kb, then
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the value of the ciphertext, C is numerically increased by D mod 2n, and
similarly if we subtract D from Kb we see the same effect on the output
ciphertext, C.
Now if we complement bit i in Kb, then if Kb had a 0 the effect on
both Kb and C is to add 2
i to them, and if the key had a 1 in that bit
position the effect is to subtract 2i. Since the ciphertext, C is known,
we can easily determine whether we added or subtracted 2i, except in
the MSB. If the length of the key is k, we can find all its bits (except the
MSB) in k−1 complementation tests. By using the decryption process we
can similarly determine the first key, Ka which is added to the plaintext,
and thus reduce the scheme to single DES which can be attacked with an
exhaustive key search of 256 single DES encryptions.
At first glance, this attack appears to require 63 related-key chosen
plaintext queries, and 63 bit comparisons to obtain Kb, and similar com-
plexities to obtain Ka. However, we can enhance this considerably by
simultaneous attacking all bits of Kb and find Kb by using a single pair!
Let C and C ′ be the ciphertexts from encrypting plaintext, P (even





This simultaneously adds or subtracts 2i to each bit position i, and as
explained previously, it adds to the ciphertext a known quantity D which
is the sum of all the 2i with signs which are either + or −. In other words,
we have:





±2i = ±{1, 3, 5, . . . , 2n − 1}.
It is easy to show that these sums are all different, and there is a very
simple algorithm for recovering all the signs from D. In more detail, it is
clear that
C − C ′ = (Kb −Kb) mod 2
n. (12)
Since −Kb = (Kb + 1) mod 2
n, we have that
C −C ′ = (2Kb + 1) mod 2
n. (13)
By just looking at the difference of C − C ′, we can determine all but
the MSB of Kb.
In total, we need only a pair of related-key chosen plaintexts, and one
comparison (subtraction) which is negligible.
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After obtaining Kb, use it to peel off the last key addition, and repeat
the attack in reverse direction on the first key addition to obtain Ka with
similar complexities. We are then left with the single DES encryption
which can be brute-forced with 256 single DES encryptions.
Consequently, DESX+ is extremely weak against related key attacks -
with one complementation of the final key,Kb you can recover it. Similarly
for the first key, Ka. And overall the attack complexity reduces to that
of attacking the inner single DES encryption.
5 Applying our Analyses as Part of a Fault Attack
We comment on how to apply our analyses of DESX and DESX+ as part
of a fault attack [8] rather than a related-key attack. Fault attacks are
considered weaker (and thus more realistic) than related-key differential
attacks since the attacker does not choose or know the changed bits in
the middle of the encryption, except that they affect a small number of
internal bits (a low hamming-weight change vector). If the change affects
a few bits at the output of the single DES, we can again see a numeric
difference which is the sum of some ±2i values. Since we do not know
which bits are affected, there are in principle 3n possibilities (each bit
position can contribute 0, +2i, and −2i to the sum) and a simple counting
argument shows that we cannot uniquely identify the case based on the
sum mod 2n. In more detail, we get 3n possible combinations of 20 to
2n − 1. On the other hand, the biggest possible value is the sum of all
these powers, or 2n−1, and the smallest possible value is −(2n−1) so the
range is about 2n+1, which is much smaller than the number of possible
partial combinations (3n). Consequently, many combinations should be
equal, and one cannot hope to uniquely determine the combination from
the final value. Just to give an example, 2 can be obtained either as
(21 + 0 + 0 + 0 . . . ) or as (22 − 21 + 0 + 0 + 0 . . . ). However, if the
change pattern has low hamming weight we expect to identify the values
in the sum uniquely. Note that if we are allowed to use fault attacks,
then Biham and Shamir showed how to use a very small number of faults
in the last few rounds of DES to find its key, requiring less than 200
faulty ciphertexts [8]. In our attack we can use the same faults used in
[8], use the fact that they create a small hamming-weight change in the
output of DES, and then simultaneously find the pre- and post-whitening
keys Ka,Kb by our technique and the inner DES key K by the Biham-
Shamir attack in [8]. The bottom line is that one needs less than 200
faulty ciphertexts (where a single bit fault is distributed uniformly over
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all the steps of DESX or DESX+) and negligible additional computation
to completely break these schemes (including the extraction of the inner
DES key K) by fault analysis.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have presented improved related-key attacks on both the original
DESX and its variant, DESX+. Our results further support the claim in
[20] that the DESX+ is weaker than DESX against related-key attacks.
We present a comparison of our attacks with previous attacks on DESX
and DESX+ in Tables 3 and 4.
Our related-key attacks exploit the fact that differences between two
encryptions are induced halfway in the middle of a cipher due to the
difference between two related keys [13]. This is then used to attack
that remaining half of the cipher. Our attacks also exploit the non-
commutativity between the XOR and modulo addition operations. In
particular, the difference operation between two related keys is chosen to
be non-commutative to the whitening key mixing operation. This ensures
that the difference observed between the corresponding two ciphertexts
would be dependent on the key difference. Interestingly, we note as a side
remark that the reason differential cryptanalysis [6, 7] works on ciphers is
that there exists non-linear components within them. If all components
within the ciphers were linear, then differential cryptanalysis would be
ineffective against them.
Table 3. Comparison of Attacks on DESX
Block Cipher Texts Memory DES Encryptions Source
DESX 232CP - 288 [11]
DESX 2 KP - 2120 [11]
DESX 232KP - 2113 [15, 16]
DESX 27RK-KP - 256 [14]
DESX 232.5KP 232.5 287.5 [9]
DESX 23.5RK-KP - 256 This paper
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